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I. INTRODUCTION
The evolution of modern communications and information technol-
ogy sparked a revolution of unprecedented proportions, bringing
about an explosion in terms of users and capabilities, as well as in-
creasing demands for both security and privacy.  To meet these secur-
ity demands, new technologies are evolving that can in fact provide a
secure and protected environment.  At the same time, however, the
technology-development path is being increasingly impacted by two
other major dynamics: the legal environment and user expectations
with respect to privacy.  Within the past four years in particular, sev-
eral major court decisions as well as the official release of documents
and illicit “leaks” have drawn enormous attention to what privacy pro-
tections must be afforded to various types of data and communica-
tions.  Users, increasingly aware of intrusions into their data and
communications—ranging from intelligence services to hackers and
criminals—are demanding greater levels of protection.  While techno-
logical approaches to greater privacy are possible, they are not cost-
free—particularly in terms of the computational overhead and other
constraints imposed on new systems.
The understanding of how the current concept of privacy fits into
the notion of a free and democratic society in the United States has
been an evolutionary process that is still ongoing. The rights that de-
fine the United States as a “free” society are a fairly well-defined
package beginning with the Bill of Rights, the first ten Amendments
to the Constitution, in which privacy is largely covered by the Fourth
Amendment’s1 protection against warrantless or unreasonable
searches and seizures.2  This right is not absolute and has been inter-
preted and modified by statute as well as various court decisions over
time that recognize changing individual and societal expectations, new
technologies, and the needs of society for public goods such as law
enforcement and national security.  The net result has been a dynamic
tension between evolving concepts of what people expect in terms of
privacy as well as the compelling needs of society to provide law en-
forcement and national security.
Recent history has seen both the rapid evolution of cyberspace, ac-
companied by an enormous expansion in terms of users and capabili-
ties, as well as unprecedented technological, economic, and social
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.”).
2. There are also privacy implications in the right of association found in the First
Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, and the Ninth Amendment. See U.S. CONST.
amends. I, IX; see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (finding a right of
privacy in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights).
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revolutions.  These new technologies have also led to a virtual explo-
sion in the amounts of data resident on servers and in systems across
the globe—often referred to as Big Data.  Along with a host of bene-
fits, the era of Big Data has also brought with it a new set of chal-
lenges in terms of security and privacy that increasingly affect the lives
of Americans.3
Cyberspace has created a new venue for crime, warfare, and espio-
nage, as well as for private acts of aggressive commercial marketing,
violating personal privacy, insulting neighbors and strangers, and em-
barrassing celebrities, pubic officials, governments, and unlucky pri-
vate individuals.  At the same time, the availability of Big Data has
also provided an opportunity for the commercial sector to analyze and
utilize the data for non-criminal purposes that may still pose serious
security and privacy questions.  Increasingly, the links between those
that store Big Data, commercial users, and the government have come
under great public scrutiny while the courts are dealing with new cases
where constitutional issues of privacy are at issue.4
Overall, this paradigm shift is not simply one of technology. It em-
braces radical changes in the economics of information as well as the
culture of modern society.  This is one of the most significant changes
in media since the invention of moveable type in the 15th Century and
ranks with other sea changes in communications, such as the inven-
tions of the telegraph, the telephone, movies, radio, and television.
While Americans have been quick to embrace the new cyber technol-
ogies and the capabilities they offer—just as they embraced the tele-
phone and radio in an earlier era—public policy and the legal regime
have not changed nor developed alongside the new technology and
are in need of serious updating and modernization.5  Here, the ex-
isting laws are decades behind the current technologies and the
problems that Big Data poses.6
3. See Abraham Wagner, Cybersecurity; From Experiment to Infrastructure, DEF.
DOSSIER, Aug. 2012, at 16, 16–18, available at http://www.afpc.org/files/august
2012.pdf; Abraham R. Wagner, AM. FOREIGN POLICY COUNCIL, Cybersecurity: New
Threats and Challenges, 1 DEF. TECH. PROGRAM BRIEF (Sept. 2013), available at
http://www.afpc.org/files/getContentPostAttachment/224.
4. See, e.g., In re Search of Info. Associated with [Redacted]@mac.com that is
Stored at Premises Controlled by Apple, Inc., 13 F. Supp. 3d 145, 149–50 (D.D.C.
2014); see also Orin Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 531, 532–33 (2005).
5. Policy studies undertaken since the late 1990s have identified serious problems
in the infrastructure, but the response by both the government and the commercial
sector has proved to be grossly inadequate. See Presidential Decision Directive on
Critical Infrastructure Protection, PDD/NSC-63 (May 22, 1998); Presidential Direc-
tive on Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience PPD-21, 2013 DAILY COMP.
PRES. DOC. 92 (Feb. 12, 2013).  It is striking that these two Presidential directives,
coming well over a decade apart, come to the same conclusions with almost nothing
having been done in between.
6. As discussed at greater length below, one good example is the Electronic
Communications and Privacy Act (ECPA) enacted in 1986 and codified at 18 U.S.C.
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It is also the case that Americans themselves see Big Data as well as
the security and privacy concerns raised differently than in years past.
Greater use of the technologies and increased awareness of potential
problems have changed privacy expectations significantly.  For their
part, both state and federal courts have responded to a myriad of
cases with a far more encompassing view of the privacy protections
afforded under the Fourth Amendment.7  Today’s challenge is there-
fore multifaceted.  As both the government and the private sector
continue to collect, analyze, and utilize data, norms, policies, and stat-
utes are needed to address the privacy and security needs of Ameri-
cans while promoting the free flow of information and the huge
economic value from the technology in ways that are consistent with
these needs.
This Article considers how the important dynamics of the evolving
legal environment and user expectations with respect to privacy and
security potentially impact the development of new security technolo-
gies and legal arrangements to support them.  Further, the Article ex-
plores new security technologies and how related environmental
concerns will impact national security missions and operations.
II. PRIVACY IN A FREE SOCIETY: CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS
The Founding Fathers spent a great deal of time working on the
nature of the free society but included very few specific rights in the
Constitution.  The Constitution created a stronger national govern-
ment to replace the weak system under the Articles of Confederation
but did not set out what “rights” the people had.  Citizens were un-
happy with the state of affairs as a British colony as well as under the
Article of Confederation, which was adopted during the Revolution
and remained in force following independence,8 but they differed on
how strong the new government should be. Opponents of the Consti-
tution complained that the new document lacked a bill of rights, but
§§ 2510–2522. See discussion infra Part X concerning Electronic Communications
and Privacy Act (“ECPA”) and the Stored Communications Act.  The ECPA also
added new provisions prohibiting access to stored electronic communications, i.e., the
Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-12.
7. See Abraham Wagner, Cybersecurity and Privacy: The Challenge of Big Data,
CTR. FOR ADVANCED STUDIES ON TERRORISM (CAST) (Apr. 2014), http://media
.wix.com/ugd/9e0486_fa3763e7579a456f8da03b707cbadead.pdf; see also Michael
Warner, Privacy and Security, Yesterday and Today, in CYBERSECURITY AND PRI-
VACY: REPORT OF THE EXPERT WORKSHOP HELD FOR THE DEFENSE ADVANCED RE-
SEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY (DARPA) (Inst. for Def. Analyses 2014).
8. The concept of a constitutional democracy was new and unique, and it was
very much a work in progress.  Unfortunately, the minutes of the Constitutional Con-
vention are very spotty, and all that exists are formal records and votes on proposals
and private notes from some of the delegates, most importantly James Madison.  We
do have rather voluminous debates over the ratification of the Constitution and the
debates in 1787–1788 over whether to have a bill of rights.  We have less helpful de-
bates over the actual adoption of the Bill of Rights.
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supporters of the Constitution—the Federalists—dismissed these as
meaningless fears of small-minded men.9   The Constitution itself does
not contain any serious definition of a free society.  After the ratifica-
tion of the Constitution, Congress proposed twelve amendments, ten
of which were ratified at the time and became the Bill of Rights.10
Most of the leading Federalists opposed a written bill of rights as
being unnecessary, useless, or even dangerous.11  While campaigning
for ratification and rejecting the idea that a bill of rights or a protec-
tion of freedom of the press was necessary, James Madison, Alexan-
der Hamilton, and John Jay launched a media campaign in New York
newspapers, publishing a huge series of essays in support of the Con-
stitution that were later collected as The Federalist Papers.  Through-
out the Federalist essays the authors denied the need for a Bill of
Rights.12 However, after the ratification of the Constitution, James
Madison, while running for a seat in the new Congress, agreed to in-
troduce a bill of rights in order to appease some of his constituents
who feared the federal government would undermine their religious
liberty.13  But, even when he introduced the Amendments in Con-
gress, Madison showed little enthusiasm for changing the Constitu-
tion.  He did not argue with passion or even much conviction for his
proposal, admitting that he had “never considered this provision so
essential to the federal constitution” that the lack of a bill of rights
should have been allowed to impede ratification.14 But, with the Con-
stitution ratified, Madison was willing to concede “that in a certain
form and to a certain extent, such a provision was neither improper
nor altogether useless.”15
Despite Madison’s reservations about the need for a bill of rights,
he nevertheless worked hard to create a series of protections for per-
sonal liberties.  While he did not include a specific right to privacy,
Madison’s amendments went to the heart of the natural rights of lib-
erty and the right to be protected from an overly intrusive govern-
ment.  Over the years, Courts have correctly found in these
Amendments a comprehensive right to privacy and to protection from
unwarranted—and warrantless16—government observation and
snooping.  Madison’s amendments, as understood today, created a
9. Cecilia Kenyon, Men of Little Faith: The Anti-Federalists on the Nature of Rep-
resentative Government, 12 WILLIAM & MARY Q. 3, 18–19, 43 (1955).
10. The first two proposed amendments were not ratified at the time, but the orig-
inal second amendment, which prevented members of Congress from raising their
own salary during the term they were elected, was finally ratified in 1992 as the
Twenty-Seventh Amendment.
11. Paul Finkelman, James Madison and the Bill of Rights: A Reluctant Paternity,
1990 SUP. CT. REV. 301, 309.
12. See id.
13. Id. at 344.
14. Id. at 341 (citing 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 453 (1789) (1834)).
15. Id. (citing 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 453 (1789) (1834)).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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fundamental right to privacy.  As the Supreme Court long ago ob-
served in Griswold v. Connecticut,17 the right to privacy is embedded
in many of the amendments and easily emanates from their penum-
bras.  Thus, “the First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is
protected from governmental intrusion.”18  The Court similarly found
protections of privacy in the Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amend-
ments.19  Justice William O. Douglas noted that “[t]he Fifth Amend-
ment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a
zone of privacy which government may not force him to surrender to
his detriment.”20  The Court in Griswold found a “zone of privacy cre-
ated by several fundamental constitutional guarantees.”21
Thus, included in the original “package” of rights are many provi-
sions that protect privacy.  Freedom of religious practice, speech,
press, and association—all embedded in the First Amendment—are
all both public and private rights.  The right to publish one’s thoughts
is a public right.  But the right to have a diary or send thoughts, ideas,
or letters (or in the modern age e-mails or text messages) to only one
person or a select group, is a private right.  Religious observance is
protected in the privacy of one’s home, as well as in the cathedral,
church, synagogue, temple, mosque, ashram, or in the streets.22  The
right to speak in public is a right of free speech, but so too would be a
telephone conversation or a Skype conversation.23  We may associate
with like-minded individuals in a public meeting or demonstration,
but we may also secretly meet with our political cohorts and not di-
vulge to the government who was at the meeting.24
In addition to First Amendment free speech rights and the rights of
privacy and personal autonomy, there are largely Fourth Amendment
rights, which prevent unreasonable searches and require warrants and
probable cause for such searches.  The Fourth Amendment was imme-
diately connected to the patriot opposition to the British writs of assis-
tance before the American Revolution.   Freedom from unreasonable
searches came as a reaction to the invasion of homes by British red-
coats and tax collectors. In the new nation, such searches were to be
barred, except under a warrant issued after the presentation of proba-
ble cause to a judge or magistrate.  Individual privacy could be vio-
17. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
18. Id. at 483.
19. Id. at 484.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 485.
22. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303–04 (1940).
23. See Olmsted v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 475–76 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).  The right to speak either in
public or in private, on a telephone, Skype or any other device are of course covered
by the First Amendment.  Issues raised with respect to private communications, such
as those raised in Olmstead and later in Katz, are largely Fourth Amendment privacy
issues.
24. See N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462–63 (1958).
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lated for a public good (e.g., law enforcement), but a judge had to
decide this was the case upon sufficient evidence of probable cause.
In terms of applying the concept to communications, the Constitu-
tion preceded the development of any electronic communications by
half a century, so certainly it was not an issue at the time.25   Interest-
ingly, however, mail service had existed for centuries, and there is no
mention in the Constitution of this medium in the context of privacy,26
other than the oblique reference to the idea that the concept of pri-
vacy attaches to personal “papers,” presumably within the home, and
no reference to letters that might be in transit outside.27  Compared to
free speech and other freedom and rights issues, there were few con-
cerns—and virtually no cases—over privacy in the press or the courts
for about a century after ratification of the Constitution.
III. LOUIS BRANDEIS IN THE OLMSTEAD AND KATZ CASES
In 1890, Louis D. Brandies and his law partner Samuel Warren pub-
lished “The Right to Privacy” in the Harvard Law Review.28 This in-
novative and path-breaking exploration of the right to be let alone by
the press—and presumably by the government—is one of the most
celebrated articles in American legal history. The article largely re-
flected Warren’s concerns about an integrated theory or concept of
privacy that went well beyond the concerns of the framers in protect-
ing the sanctity of the home embodied in the Fourth Amendment.29
25. Samuel F. B. Morse, who perfected the telegraph, sent his first message from
the U.S. Capitol building to his associate in Baltimore on May 24, 1844.  Bernard S.
Finn, Morse, Samuel Finley Breese, AM. NAT’L BIOGRAPHY ONLINE (2000), http://
www.anb.org/articles/13/13-01183.html?a=1&n=Morse%2C%20Samuel&d=10&ss=
0&q=1.
26. The Constitution does empower the national government to create a postal
system and build roads to support that system. U.S. CONST., art I § 8, cl. 7.
27. During the Cold War, the CIA engaged in a mail-opening program within the
U.S. at various post offices, which became subject to a scandal later on, reported in
the Family Jewels study, but most of the objections related to CIA operations within
the U.S., barred by statute, rather than to privacy issues.  Some later cases make refer-
ence to mail and its “oblique packaging” where the user has an expectation the con-
tents will not be seen.  None of the cases appear to cover post cards with writing on
the outside.
28. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1890) [hereinafter Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy].  For a nice
edition of this article with an introduction, see SAMUEL D. WARREN & LOUIS D.
BRANDEIS, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY (Alan Childress eds., Quid Pro Books ed. 2010)
(1890).
29. See id.  Written primarily by Brandeis, it was the first publication in the United
States to advocate a right to privacy, articulating that right primarily as a “right to be
let alone.” See Dorothy J. Glancy, The Invention of the Right to Privacy, 21 ARIZ. L.
REV. 1, 1–5 (1979).  It began at the suggestion of Warren, based on his “deep-seated
abhorrence of the invasions of social privacy,” id. at 6 (citing Letter from Brandeis to
Warren (Apr. 8, 1905), and introduces the fundamental principle that “the individual
shall have full protection in person and in property.” See Warren & Brandeis, The
Right to Privacy, supra note 28, at 193.   They acknowledge that this is a fluid principle
that has been reconfigured over the centuries as a result of political, social, and eco-
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The article focused on the right of individuals to hold a property inter-
est in unpublished materials, in their own image, and, in effect, mate-
rial about their private lives.
The authors noted the alarming fact that “[i]nstantaneous photo-
graphs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of
private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten
to make good the prediction that ‘what is whispered in the closet shall
be proclaimed from the house-tops.’”30   They argued that “[f]or years
there has been a feeling that the law must afford some remedy for the
unauthorized circulation of portraits of private persons”31 and that
something had to be done to remedy “the evil of the invasion of pri-
vacy by the newspapers,”32 which had been “long keenly felt.”33
They also argued that this right was essentially rooted in property,
since there was no constitutional claim they could make.  At the same
time, they argued for a new tort—the invasion of privacy.
The article was instantly important.  One contemporary scholar
called it “one of the most brilliant excursions in the field of theoretical
jurisprudence which the recent literature of the law discloses.”34 Ros-
coe Pound argued that it did “nothing less than add a chapter to our
law.”35  It “remained the most cited article in American legal scholar-
ship until 1947”36 and led to a whole field of litigation based on inva-
sion of privacy.37
While the Warren and Brandeis article created a new field for pri-
vate individuals, it also helped Americans think about government in-
trusion in a new way.  This was necessary because the early 20th
century saw significant technological advances and rapid growth in
telecommunications.  Both law enforcement agencies and intelligence
services found that intercept operations could yield useful data and
that a greater public good was achieved in doing so.  However, for
years they encountered little opposition to such activities.38
nomic change. See Glancy, supra, at 7–8.  The essay begins by describing the develop-
ment of the law with regard to life and property. See Warren & Brandeis, The Right
to Privacy, supra note 28, at 193.  Originally, the common law “right to life” only
provided a remedy for physical interference with life and property. Id.  Later, the
scope of the “right to life” expanded to recognize the “legal value of sensations,” and
the concept of property expanded from protecting only tangible property to intangi-
ble property. Id.




34. MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: A LIFE 101 (2009) (quoting El-
bridge L. Adams, The Right of Privacy and Its Relation to the Law of Libel, 39 AM. L.
REV. 37, 37 (1905)).
35. Id. (quoting Roscoe Pound, Dean of the Harvard Law School).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., JEFFREY T. RICHELSON, A CENTURY OF SPIES: INTELLIGENCE IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY (1997).
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The question of whether communications interception without a
warrant violated the Fourth Amendment privacy guarantee did not
even reach the Supreme Court until the Olmstead case in 1928.39
Chief Justice Taft’s majority opinion held that the privacy guarantee in
the Fourth Amendment applied to the “place” and did not cover elec-
tronic communications traveling outside the home.40  A dissenting
opinion in Olmstead by Louis Brandeis, now a Supreme Court justice,
argued otherwise.  Updating his 1890 argument, Brandeis asserted
that the Fourth Amendment privacy guarantee should in fact attach to
the person, and to personal communications, and not be limited to a
place such as the home.  Most legal scholars see the Brandeis dissent
in Olmstead as one his great pieces of legal authorship, but the fact
remained that it was only a dissenting opinion, and Chief Justice Taft’s
opinion remained the law of the land until United States v. Katz in
1967.41
Brandeis was ultimately vindicated in 1967 in Katz, which remains
the leading case on government searches involving electronic commu-
nications and involving more generally the notion that individuals
have an expectation of privacy in their homes and also in some public
places, such as telephone booths.42  Concurring, the second Justice
John Marshall Harlan succinctly noted:
I join the opinion of the Court, which I read to hold only (a) that an
enclosed telephone booth is an area where, like a home, Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383, and unlike a field, Hester v. United
States, 265 U.S. 57, a person has a constitutionally protected reason-
able expectation of privacy; (b) that electronic as well as physical
intrusion into a place that is in this sense private may constitute a
violation of the Fourth Amendment; and (c) that the invasion of a
constitutionally protected area by federal authorities is, as the Court
has long held, presumptively unreasonable in the absence of a
search warrant.43
Here, the Court not only reversed Olmstead, it also set forth two
major principles.  As Brandeis argued earlier, it changed the Fourth
39. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 455 (1928).
40. Id. at 455–65.  Most legal scholars see Chief Justice Taft’s decision in Olmstead
as one of the worst Supreme Court decisions ever.  However, Taft and the majority of
the Court were largely reflecting a concept of privacy that was reasonably well-settled
at the time, although they seemed to be totally disconnected from the reality of tech-
nological change.
41. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).  The modern doctrine of a “right to
privacy” developed out of cases denying women—even married women—the right to
obtain birth control. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
42. Katz, 389 U.S. at 359.  Unfortunately Brandeis, who retired from the Court in
1939 and died in 1941, did not live to see this change.  In Katz there was a 7–1 major-
ity of the Court with Justice Stewart writing for the majority, as well as a concurring
opinion by Justice Harlan. Id. at 348.  In the case, Katz was calling his bookie from a
phone booth where his call was intercepted by the police. Id. at 351.
43. Id. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring).
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\2-4\TWL404.txt unknown Seq: 10  7-MAR-16 14:45
606 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2
Amendment concept of privacy as attaching to the “person” rather
than the “place” (i.e., a home).  It also established a two-fold test for
applicability of the Fourth Amendment protection, with the first being
whether the person has a “reasonable expectation of privacy” and the
second being whether this particular expectation is one that society
sees as reasonable.
Even in Katz, however, the entire Court did not accept the Brandeis
concept.  In a dissenting opinion, Justice Hugo Black, a justice
honored for his strong defenses of civil liberties and civil rights, ar-
gued that the Fourth Amendment, as a whole, was only meant to pro-
tect “things” from physical search and seizure; it was not meant to
protect personal privacy. Black further argued that wiretapping was
analogous to the act of eavesdropping, which was around even when
the Bill of Rights was drafted, and concluded that if the drafters of the
Fourth Amendment had meant for it to protect against eavesdropping
they would have included the proper language.44
Under Katz there was no recognized expectation of privacy in data
about communications, which the Intelligence Community calls “ex-
ternals” and has been referred to over the years as “pen register data,
trap and trace data,” and most recently “metadata.” Metadata is liter-
ally “data about data,” so in the context of telecommunications, it
would include records of the day, time, length of a phone call, and
what phone numbers were involved.  In the pre-Internet days this
would have been the basis of a phone bill that listed all calls made to
and from a number.  But metadata does not include the content of the
call and in the case of a phone call would have involved some sort of
wiretap or other mechanical listening device.  Actual content could
only be obtained with a court order and warrant.  In the context of e-
mail conversations, metadata also includes information about the
source of an e-mail, the IP address from which it was sent, the size of
the e-mail communication, whether it had attachments or not, and the
e-mail address (the Internet equivalent of a phone number), but not
the actual content of the e-mail.
As early as 1979, in Smith v. Maryland, the Supreme Court recog-
nized the important difference between actual conversations and the
content of electronic communications, and metadata.45  In Smith, the
Court viewed metadata (such as records of phone calls) as business
records rather than personal communications. Thus, the collection of
metadata (i.e. phone records) did not require a warrant, while actually
listening to the conversations did.   The Court’s analysis here was
based on the idea that phone users cannot really have any actual ex-
pectation of privacy regarding the numbers they dial, since they typi-
cally know that these are held by the telephone company for various
44. Id. at 364 (Black, J., dissenting).
45. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979).
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legitimate business purposes.  Indeed, in 1979 all long distance calls
were considered “toll calls” and were logged by the phone company
for billing purposes because these calls were  billed separately, at a per
minute rate.  In the past this had been done with local calls as well.
Under the well-established “third party” doctrine, users gave this in-
formation to the phone company when they initiated the calls and as-
sumed the risk it might be revealed to the police and others.46  Some
debate remains as to whether this “metadata” created on phone com-
pany computers is the phone company’s or became “personal data”
when mailed to the subscriber.  One complication to this issue is that
the records—all the metadata—are actually produced by the phone
company, not by the customer using the phone.
Most recently, the entire concept of privacy expectations with re-
spect to metadata has become a subject of debate in various court
cases, as have other types of data that did not even exist at the time of
Smith, and in Congressional debate over the reauthorization of Sec-
tion 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act.47  The argument of civil libertari-
ans is that aggregating large amounts of metadata by the government
poses a threat to privacy and is leading to a constitutional crisis.48  The
government asserts that this bulk data collection is necessary for na-
tional security and law enforcement but does not threaten individual
privacy and that it has been securely storing this data otherwise main-
tained by the telephone companies, which is not searched without a
specific warrant from a federal court.49
46. Id. at 744. Under some phone plans long distance calls (especially calls made
to non-U.S. numbers are still logged by the phone company and billed as “toll calls.”
In addition, cell phone companies keep a record of all calls made to and from cell
phones and sometimes include them in the cell phone bill. While cell phone plans are
increasingly moving toward unlimited calls (as land lines are in most places in the
U.S.), there are still cell phone plans with limited numbers of calls, which of course
means the company must keep a record of all calls for billing purposes.
47. There is extensive literature on the debate over Section 215.  See, for example,
Abraham Wagner, Does NSA Need Section 215? (Center for Advanced Studies on
Terrorism, May 14, 2015) and Dia Kayyali, Section 215 of the Patriot Act Expires in
June, Is Congress Ready?, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 29, 2015), available at
www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/01/section-215-patriot-act-expires-june-congress-ready.
48. Laura K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection: Statutory and Constitutional
Considerations, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 757 (2014); David Gray & Danielle Ci-
tro, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62 (2013).
49. In June 2015, Congress failed to reauthorize Section 215 of the USA PA-
TRIOT Act but rather enacted a compromise law, the USA Freedom Act, which
largely ended bulk collection of metadata by NSA and left the various telephone com-
panies to maintain this data on their computers.  This solution makes little legal or
logical sense.  Civil liberties advocates seem to think that holding the metadata on
private servers, subject to hacking and maintained by personnel with no background
checks or security clearances, is preferable to the NSA maintaining it on highly secure
servers.  In either case it can only be accessed with a court order.  The new solution
also has serious flaws in that multiple telephone companies are involved; they are not
required to maintain the data for an extended period; and timely access may be im-
possible for terrorism investigations.
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IV. PRIVACY IN THE AFTERMATH OF KATZ
The landmark Katz case had an immediate impact on the public
good, largely in the area of law enforcement where police had rou-
tinely engaged in unrestricted wiretapping.  Congress responded to
the decision with the Omnibus Safe Streets and Crime Act of 1968,50
which established criteria for the police to obtain judicial warrants for
wiretaps supporting their lawful investigations.51  This imposed a level
of order on the domestic side of wiretaps and surveillance for the next
decade or so.  But the Katz regime began to break down in the 1980s
(or before) in the wake of new communications technologies, new sur-
veillance technologies, and the emergence of new threats (or the per-
ception of new threats) to domestic peace and national security.52
The declaration of a “War on Drugs” by President Richard M.
Nixon in June 197153 soon led to a plethora of demands for relaxation
of strict warrant requirements and abandonment of the idea of an ex-
pectation of privacy, even in one’s own home.54  This trend was exac-
erbated in the 1980s when President Reagan “pledg[ed] an
‘unshakable’ commitment ‘to do what is necessary to end the drug
menace’” in the United States.55  This soon led to what scholars and
even jurists called the “drug exception” to Fourth Amendment law
and other areas of law.56  In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’
Ass’n, Justice Thurgood Marshall protested in dissent that “[t]here is
no drug exception to the Constitution, any more than there is a com-
50. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2520
(2012).
51. Id. §§ 2011, 2013, 2015.
52. An excellent review of the legal regime in this area can be found in GINA
STEVENS & CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-326, PRIVACY: AN OVER-
VIEW OF FEDERAL STATUTES GOVERNING WIRETAPPING AND ELECTRONIC SURVEIL-
LANCE (2012) (providing an excellent review of the legal regime in this area).
53. A Brief History of the War on Drugs, DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE, http://
www.drugpolicy.org/new-solutions-drug-policy/brief-history-drug-war (last visited
Apr. 2, 2015).
54. Paul Finkelman, The Second Casualty of War: Civil Liberties and the War on
Drugs, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1389, 1410–11 (1993) [hereinafter Finkelman, Second Casu-
alty of War].
55. Steven Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging “Drug Exception” to the Bill of
Rights, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 889, 890 (1987) (quoting President’s Reagan Message An-
nouncing Federal Initiatives Against Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime, 18
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1311, 1312–14 (Oct. 14, 1982)).
56. For a full discussion of how the War on Drugs impacted the entire Bill of
Rights, including freedom religion, speech, press, and the right to an attorney, see
Finkelman, Second Casualty of War, supra note 54, at 390; Paul Finkelman, The War
on Defense Lawyers, in NEW FRONTIERS IN DRUG POLICY 113 (Arnold S. Trebach &
Zevin B. Zeese eds., 1991); Paul Finkelman, The Latest Front on the War on Drugs:
The First Amendment, 2 DRUG L. REP. 229 (1991); and Paul Finkelman & Michael W.
Gadomski, Overdose: The Failure of the U.S. Drug War and Attempts at Legalization:
Introduction, 6 ALB. GOV’T. L. REV. vii (2013).
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munism exception or an exception for other real or imagined sources
of domestic unrest.”57
While legal academics, lawyers, and courts focused on privacy issues
in the context of the War on Drugs, in the national security area, Katz
had little impact for about a decade.  At the time the very existence of
the National Security Agency (“NSA”) itself had been classified, and
there was limited public discussion of foreign intercepts supporting
intelligence and military missions.58  A vast majority of the legal and
political community (and the nation as a whole) assumed the govern-
ment had a perfect right to spy overseas to protect the nation.  Fur-
thermore, most of the electronic intercepts targeted foreign nationals
outside the United States, and thus there were no clear constitutional
issues involved.  The Bill of Rights, especially in the case of the Fourth
Amendment, limits what the government may do and would therefore
apply to foreign nationals in the United States, but courts at that time
had never extended the general protections of the Bill of Rights to
activities taking place outside the United States, especially when they
involve noncitizens.59   This well-ordered universe was upset by sev-
eral events during the 1970s.  Leaks in the New York Times of the
CIA Family Jewels study disclosed major abuses by NSA, which had
been engaging in warrantless domestic collection operations ordered
by the Nixon White House.60
57. The Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 641 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
58. The NSA was officially established in October 1952 by a secret directive from
President Truman as the successor to the Armed Forces Security Agency.  Its actual
existence was classified for several years, and the term NSA was jokingly referred to
as “No Such Agency” and “Never Say Anything.”  In the current wake of disclosures,
leaks, and lawsuits, the NSA has been engaged in a publicity campaign to garner
public support for its important national security and cyber security missions.
59. Illustrative of this were the “Insular Cases,” heard by the Supreme Court in
the wake of the Spanish-American War.  In these cases the Court refused to apply the
Constitution to new territories under U.S. control.  Thus, in Dorr v. United States, 195
U.S. 138 (1904), the Court held that even though the United States occupied and
governed the Philippines, there was no right to jury trial there under the Constitution.
In this, and other cases, the Court held that the Constitution did not follow the flag.
See 2 MELVIN I. UROFSKY & PAUL FINKELMAN, A MARCH OF LIBERTY: A CONSTITU-
TIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 592–95 (3rd. ed. 2011).  Clearly, if the Con-
stitution did not protect the due process rights of an American citizen, residing in a
United States territory, then the Constitution did not protect the rights of non-U.S.
citizens living in places not under the jurisdiction or control of the United States.
60. See Seymour Hersh, Huge C.I.A. Operation Reported in U.S. Against Antiwar
Forces, Other Dissidents in Nixon Years, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1974, at 1.  “Widely
known as the ‘Family Jewels,’ this document consists of almost 700 pages of responses
from CIA employees to a 1973 directive from Director of Central Intelligence James
Schlesinger asking them to report activities they thought might be inconsistent with
the Agency’s charter.”  CIA, The Family Jewels (May 16, 1973), available at  http://
www.foia.cia.gov/collection/family-jewels.  Most relevant here are operations such as
NSA’s Project SHAMROCK and Project MINARET which illegally collected against
anti-war activists inside the United States.  Such activities violated the charter of the
CIA, which was only authorized to operate outside of the United States.   These
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These leaks led to congressional investigations of abuses by national
security agencies through the Church and Pike Committee investiga-
tions in the Senate and House.61  After these investigations, Congress
passed legislation that provided for both increased oversight of intelli-
gence activities as well as specific limitations on foreign surveillance
activities in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
(“FISA”).62  FISA accomplished several important things in terms of
privacy.  For what it termed “U.S. persons,” the law established a war-
rant requirement for intercept, even where one party might be outside
the country.63   It also established a special federal court, the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”), to review applications for
warrants to be issued under FISA.
V. PRIVACY POST-9/11
The terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001,
opened up a new era in national security in several dimensions.
Threats to the homeland from non-state actors were of central con-
cern, but the use of cell phones and Internet services to facilitate ter-
rorist operations suddenly became a major concern.  Responding to
this threat, the Intelligence Community rapidly scaled up new collec-
tion programs with some legal cover from the Justice Department.64
The Intelligence Community began this undertaking to meet serious
national security challenges involving not only new technologies but
projects actually date from 1945 and were initiated by the Armed Forces Security
Agency (AFSA), a predecessor to NSA.
61. Senator Frank Church of Idaho was chairman of the United States Senate Se-
lect Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Ac-
tivities in 1975; Representative Otis Pike of New York was chair of the House Select
Committee on Intelligence in 1975.
62. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (2012).
63. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801.  It remains somewhat unclear precisely who are included
as U.S. persons now. Id. § 1801(i).  Clearly it includes citizens and legal immigrants.
Id.  Most likely it will be interpreted to cover illegal immigrants and possibly tourists
and others who might be in the U.S. for any number of reasons.  The “Law Enforce-
ment Access to Data Stored Abroad Act” currently before Congress does define a
“U.S. person” as one who is “a citizen or lawful permanent resident alien of the
United States, or an entity or organization organized under the laws of the United
States or a State or political subdivision thereof.” Law Enforcement Access to Data
Stored Abroad Act, S. 2871, 113th Cong. § 3 (2014); see also Jack M. Balkin, The
Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2008).
64. An initial analysis dated September 25, 2001, from the Office of Legal Counsel
at Justice, authored by John Yoo, argues that the recently enacted Authorization for
the Use of Military Force (“AUMF”), passed after the terrorist attack on 9/11, pro-
vided adequate legal authority for these programs.  Memorandum from John C. Yoo,
Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to the Deputy Counsel to the
President, On the President’s Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military Opera-
tions Against Terrorists and Nations Supporting Them (Sept. 25, 2001), available at
http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Memorandum-from-John-C-
Yoo-Sept-25-2001.pdf.  The key program was highly classified (heavily compartmen-
talized), and government lawyers from other offices were not cleared or consulted.
These actions continue to be at the core of an ongoing debate.
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users outside and inside the United States moved well beyond the
constraints of FISA as initially enacted.  At the time, the government
elected to rely more on secrecy than statute.
Initial leaks to the New York Times in 2005 created a firestorm
within the Intelligence Community and in the courts.  That firestorm
has yet to abate.  For a decade now the government has been fighting
one court battle after another with respect to privacy issues raised by
these ongoing collection operations.  Congress attempted to amelio-
rate the problem with the passage of the FISA Amendments Act of
2008 (“FAA”),65 which provides additional authorities to the Intelli-
gence Community in Sections 215 and 702 of the FAA, as well as ret-
roactive immunity to service providers for assisting in these collection
operations.  At present, major challenges to the FAA as being an un-
constitutional violation of the Fourth Amendment right to privacy are
pending in the federal courts, and a Supreme Court ruling in the mat-
ter is probably a year away.66
VI. PRIVACY AS A DYNAMIC CONCEPT
For most of history people have had very little to keep private. Lit-
eracy was limited, communications were costly and even more limited,
and there was no Big Data.  Basic concerns in this area related to the
sanctity of the home and family relations within the home, and, in
most cultures, to the coverage of parts of the body aptly termed “pri-
vate parts.”  Widespread literacy, new technologies, and related eco-
nomics changed the world—largely within the past few decades.
While the landmark Katz case moved the nation to the Brandeis con-
cept of legally protected privacy, new technologies radically increased
the amounts of personal data needing protection.  At the same time, a
host of factors—including media disclosures, greater public aware-
ness, and others—have changed individual expectations with respect
to privacy.
65. FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.).
66. The first major challenge was rejected by the Supreme Court in Clapper v.
Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013), on the basis of standing and did not reach
the constitutional issue.  Most recently, the Klayman  case (D.C. Circuit) again raises
the constitutional issue, and the district court found no issue with repect to standing,
although the D.C. Court of Appeals held differently and has recently remanded the
case.  Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013), vacated and remanded,
800 F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 2015).  The same issue was also raised in the Second Circuit in
ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d in part, vacated in part,
remanded, 785 F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 2015), where that court held that there was no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in conformity with the Supreme Court’s holding in
Smith v. Maryland.  On appeal, the Second Circuit did not reach the constitutional
issues because it concluded that the challenged program was not authorized by the
statute on which the government based its claim of legal authority.  ACLU v. Clapper,
785 F.3d 787, 824 (2d Cir. 2015).
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Privacy has become a dynamic concept, and in many respects the
legal regime is several generations behind current technology and how
it is being utilized.  For most of the 20th century “privacy” usually
concerned letters mailed from one person to another, telegraph com-
munications, photographs privately made, conversations among a few
people in person or on the telephone, or between two parties. New
technologies and the way they are utilized have radically changed peo-
ple’s expectations with respect to both privacy and the security of
their personal data.67  At the outset it is important to recognize that
both the type and amount of personal data has grown by astronomic
proportions, in what is now being referred to as the era of “Big
Data.”68  What is generated and stored has grown by many orders of
magnitude.  Apart from anything else, people have a great deal more
to be concerned about.69   To what extent they are actually con-
cerned—aside from what is indicated by the amount of interest shown
by civil rights organizations such as the American Civil Liberties
Union (“ACLU”), Electronic Frontier Foundation (“EFF”), and
others—is an open question, but clearly there are major concerns.70
One aspect of the modern technical world is that physical media of
all kinds are rapidly vanishing.  Not only are communications elec-
tronic, but photographs, movies, music, books, newspapers, health
records, and virtually anything else that once existed as paper or
plastic are now digital files that are stored and downloaded.  Servers,
clouds, and personal devices to access them have become central to
modern life.  As users entrust increasing amounts of personal data to
these systems, their concerns and expectations about privacy and se-
curity understandably grow far more significant.  In the pre-electronic
age, a private or intimate letter could not be easily shared with large
numbers of people, and, once destroyed, the letter was gone.  Today,
e-mail and photographs sent electronically, or even just stored elec-
tronically, can be shared with untold numbers of people through a few
keystrokes.  The recent hacking of servers holding personal images of
67. The media are filled on a daily basis with stories of hacks and invasions of
various servers and stores of personal data of all kinds, including communications,
financial data, health records, personal images, and a host of other things.
68. See Big Data: Seizing Opportunities, Preserving Values (Executive Office of
the President, May 2014).
69. For one important exploration of the magnitude and implications of the lack
of privacy in data, see LORI ANDREWS, I KNOW WHO YOU ARE AND I SAW WHAT
YOU DID:  SOCIAL NETWORKS AND THE DEATH OF PRIVACY (2012).
70. As a practical matter, the vast majority of Americans simply don’t care that
NSA may be storing old phone billing data, now called “metadata,” which the phone
carriers themselves store, and generally appreciate that NSA’s mission is to protect
the nation from terrorist attacks and other significant threats. At the same time, civil
libertarians at the ACLU and Electronic Frontier Foundation (“EFF”), for example,
think otherwise, and their view appears to have prevailed.
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entertainment personalities, including Jennifer Lawrence, Kate
Upton, and others, received considerable media attention.71
It is also the case now that the nature of the data and individual
expectations of privacy are getting somewhat confused, particularly in
the area of social media.  Old distinctions between truly personal com-
munications, for example, and business records are difficult to apply
to many things like Facebook and Instagram postings.  While it is clear
that specific personal communications and even data such as private
photographs intended to be shared only with designated recipients
still retain their private character, postings to social media sites to a
massive group of “friends” and the public alike take on a different
character and possibly a different set of expectations.72  Here a new
concept of “quasi-private” data may be an approach to consider.
A second new area of concern involves questions of privacy from
whom.  Virtually all of the prior statutes, case law, and doctrines relate
to government surveillance, generally for law enforcement and na-
tional security purposes.  Currently, commercial vendors and hackers
are madly using and abusing data in their possession as service provid-
ers or thieves.  The third-party doctrine that has been applied is seri-
ously outdated, and it is likely that many new cases and statutes will
evolve in the near future.  It is also the case that protection of com-
mercial infrastructure has become a national security concern, and
currently the NSA has been assigned to protect the infrastructure for
some sixteen specific commercial sector activities.73
Certainly the legal regime with respect to privacy and security itself
is seriously outdated. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act
(“ECPA”) (1986) is decades old, even with some minor amendments.
Similarly, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”) for felony
computer hacking and sharing of addresses and other information
needs revision.  New legislation has stalled in Congress for years now.
At the same time, case law in federal and state courts over various
privacy and security issues continues to grow.74
71. Alana Horowitz & Stephanie Marcus, Jennifer Lawrence’s Nude Photos Leak
Online, Other Celebs Targeted, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 31, 2014, 6:34 PM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/08/31/jennifer-lawrence-nude-photos_n_5745260.html.
72. Understanding the so-called “privacy settings” and operations of Facebook,
for example, is a legal and technical challenge to say the least.  How broadly any
posted image on Facebook will be shared or seen regardless of the users intended
settings is difficult for any user to determine.
73. Interview with Mike Rogers, Admiral, USN, Dir., NSA, and Commander,
CYBERCOM (Feb. 4, 2015).
74. See, e.g., United States v. Auernheimer, 748 F.3d 525 (3d Cir. 2014); In re
Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litig., 988 F. Supp. 2d 434 (D. Del.
2013); In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040 (N.D. Cal. 2013); Pirozzi
v. Apple Inc., 913 F. Supp. 2d 840, 847 (N.D. Cal. 2012); United States v. Warshak,
631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010); Joffe v. Google Inc., 746 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 2013); In
re Google Inc. St. View Elec. Commc’ns Litig., 733 F. Supp. 2d 1381 (J.P.M.L. 2010).
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VII. EVOLUTION OF CYBERSPACE AND BIG DATA
At the outset of what may be called the Internet Era, few antici-
pated the extent to which rapidly evolving information and communi-
cations technologies would come to dominate all aspects of modern
life, including governmental and commercial operations.  For well
over a decade little was done to provide adequate privacy and security
protections for government and commercial systems.  This mirrors
other technological developments.  Movable type printing revolution-
ized European society starting in the mid-15th century.  But it took
more than a century for England to begin to regulate printing,75 and
English courts did not begin to regulate seditious libel in any signifi-
cant way until the 1606 case De Libellis Famosis.76   Similarly, the first
commercial radio station (KDKA in Pittsburgh) began operating in
November 1920, but Congress did not attempt to regulate commercial
broadcasting until the passage of the Radio Act of 1927,77 and signifi-
cant modern regulation of commercial broadcasting did not come
about until the Communications Act of 1934,78 which created the Fed-
eral Communications Commission (“FCC”).
Following this pattern of only slowly responding to new communi-
cations technology, the United States has been incredibly tardy in
passing legislation responding to new Internet technology.  This has
been true both for the protection of users from government surveil-
lance, as well as to protect users from hackers, commercial exploita-
tion, or criminal banditry.  But it has also been true for the failure to
provide guidelines for Internet surveillance for legitimate law enforce-
ment and national security purposes.   At the same time, most users
were initially slow in demanding security and privacy features.  Within
the past few years, however, radical changes in the number and nature
of attacks on systems of all types have greatly increased the demand
for new privacy technologies.
The rapid evolution of cyberspace and the accompanying rise of Big
Data has clearly been one of the greatest technological revolutions in
recorded history.  What began as a Defense Department experiment
at the Advanced Research Projects Agency (“ARPA,” later
“DARPA”) in the late 1960s has transformed almost all aspects of life
75. FREDRICK S. SIEBERT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN ENGLAND, 1476–1776: THE
RISE AND DECLINE OF GOVERNMENT CONTROL 27 (1952).
76. De Libellis Famosis, (1606) 5 Co. Rep. 125a (Court of the Star Chamber); 77
Eng. Rep. 250 (Star Chamber).
77. The Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162 (repealed 1934).  An
Act to Regulate Radio Communication, Pub. L. No. 62-264, 37 Stat. 302 (1912) (re-
pealed 1927), provided for licensing of private radio operators but did not contem-
plate commercial radio stations and had no provisions for regulating them.  Passed in
the wake of the sinking of the RMS Titanic in April 1912, the act was mostly aimed at
insuring that ships at sea have radios on board at all times.
78. Communications Act of 1934, 7 U.S.C. § 151 (repealed 2000).
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with new technologies and an explosive growth in e-mail, the world
wide web, and net-based applications never anticipated.
Security and privacy were not essential elements of the original
ARPAnet design.  At the outset the ARPAnet was an experiment in
optimizing network resources with “switched packet” technology as
an alternative to traditional “line switching.”79  E-mail was not even a
part of the concept, the web did not yet exist, there were no browsers
or net-based content, and there were no early commercial or national
security applications. Quite simply, in these early days there was noth-
ing on the net to steal or hack, and access to the net was limited to a
few scientists and other users who had hardwired connections to
mainframe computers.
Apart from DARPA’s developmental work, a wide range of users—
including the government, commercial firms, and educational institu-
tions—acquired computers connected to various networks, adding
data at an exponential rate.  With the transition to the Internet, net-
works were given low-cost global connectivity.  For the first time in
history, the marginal cost of worldwide communications fell to almost
zero, as the web made it easier for users with new applications and
web-based content to grow exponentially.
Few entrants into cyberspace were aware of or cared about the myr-
iad security vulnerabilities that existed in operating systems, server
software, middleware, application layers, router software, and else-
where in the Internet world.  For well over a decade, the prevailing
notion was that if there were problems, it must be somebody else’s job
to fix them.
A. Early Vulnerabilities and Security Efforts
The commercial world was quick to adopt the net, offer a vast range
of applications, and generate Big Data, but it was largely unwilling
and uninterested in paying to either secure it or provide privacy.
Even banks failed to address the problem until they had been robbed
of large sums.  Government users were not much better as they
quickly embraced cost-effective networked systems but failed to ad-
dress critical vulnerabilities.80
Internet programmers recognized vulnerabilities in operating sys-
tems as well as server design.  Early attacks generally involved
malware, which disabled vulnerable computers and exploited unpro-
tected data, stealing large amounts of it from servers connected to the
net.  Microsoft distributed “fixes” and “patches” to deal with some
vulnerabilities while third party vendors like Norton sold security
software that attempted to deal with a wider range of malware, in-
79. See STEPHEN SEGALLER, NERDS 2.0.1: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE INTERNET
68, 373 (1998).
80. See Wagner, supra note 3.
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stalled firewalls, and gave users regular updates as new threats were
identified.
These early entrants into the field saw the threat from malicious net
activity and tried to protect users from malware by removing suspi-
cious code—such as viruses, worms, and Trojans—from infected com-
puters.  Other firms offered encryption software, such as Pretty Good
Privacy (“PGP”) that enabled their users to protect sensitive files,
while a secure version of net protocol, :/https, enabled secure transac-
tions over the web.  In some ways cyberspace was becoming safer and
more secure, but the adversarial threat was advancing at an even
greater pace.81
B. Growing Threats from Home and Abroad
Growth of e-commerce and Big Data brought new demands for pri-
vacy and security, while the proliferation of networked national secur-
ity systems also required secure networks and applications of higher
standards.  Vulnerabilities continued to be identified while new
threats were seen on a daily basis.  As the financial sector entered
cyberspace, lucrative targets for cybercrime emerged, and net-based
theft from banks and credit card fraud became a booming business.
Big Data became both a target and a commodity.
While the early threats came largely from youthful hackers and dis-
gruntled system administrators, this past decade witnessed the evolu-
tion of far more serious cyber threats from expert criminals as well as
well-trained military units and national security agencies assigned to
cyber-warfare and cyber-espionage missions.  Debate continues over
the range of potential threats, ranging from denial of service to a type
of apocalyptic attack often referred to as a “digital Pearl Harbor,”
which could involve massive denial of net services, widespread theft of
data, possibly the corruption of data being sent over the net, or even a
total shutdown of the Internet.  Any of these events would not only
affect business, banking, airline and train service, and national secur-
ity, but would totally disrupt the services of a modern society, such as
the delivery of electricity, water, or natural gas, the use of telephones
and the operation of hospitals, grocery stores, fire departments, emer-
gency (911) services, and police departments.  Modern life in indus-
trial nations is now almost entirely dependent on functioning
computers and a smoothly operating Internet.
VIII. THE EVOLVING LEGAL REGIME
As in other areas, the legal regime for privacy and security is a com-
posite of constitutional law, federal statutes, case law, executive or-
ders, and regulations that have the effect of statutes.  Looking first to
81. Id.
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the Constitution and the framers’ intent, the Constitution itself says
very little about national security and nothing about intelligence what-
soever.  The technologies of the time did not include electricity or any
type of communications other than the postal service, which at the
time was costly and highly limited.  Inferring what the framers might
have said and done if they had been in the Internet Era remains a
subject of ongoing discussion among legal scholars.82
As discussed above, the issue of privacy in electronic communica-
tions did not reach the U.S. Supreme Court until 1928 in Olmstead,
even though the telegraph had been around for close to a century and
the telephone for about a half-century.  Wiretapping, which came into
use shortly after the Civil War, has generally been attributed to
criminals seeking information about which trains to rob by tapping
telegraph lines adjacent to railroad tracks.83  While the historical liter-
ature in this area is limited, it can be assumed that law enforcement
authorities followed suit in an effort to catch criminals soon
thereafter.
In the national security area, intelligence services began watching
international cable traffic almost as soon as these cables were installed
in the early 20th century.  One limiting factor was that the intelligence
services in both the United States and Great Britain had only a hand-
ful of staff, and of these only a few engaged in so-called “signals intel-
ligence.”84  In both nations these activities were shielded in secrecy
and largely unknown to the general public.  In Great Britain, the Offi-
cial Secrets Act of 1911 shielded these activities,85 while in the United
States, these limited activities conducted by the Black Chamber were
hidden in New York City and were generally unknown to most
people.86
82. Several current Supreme Court justices have remarked that they do not en-
tirely understand all new technologies but nevertheless need to deal with cases involv-
ing them.
83. See, e.g., Michael Warner, Privacy and Security, Yesterday and Today, IDA
REPORT, supra note 7.
84. The Black Chamber: The Man Who Made Edward Snowden Inevitable, THE
ECONOMIST, Dec. 19, 2015, at 39. The numbers are quite amazing.  In 1900, for exam-
ple, Great Britain’s intelligence service (The War Office Intelligence Branch) had a
total staff of twenty-seven, which was then the largest in the world.  In the U.S., the
Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), which was the nation’s intelligence service at the
time, had a total staff of seven, which was reduced to five during a budget crisis in
1903.  In those days, intelligence was simply not a serious business, and of this, the
fraction of the staff devoted to intercept or signals intelligence was even smaller.
These limited activities were conducted in secret and attracted little or no attention at
all, which helps to explain why there were no court challenges.
85. Official Secrets Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo 5 c 28 (U.K.).
86. This was done for both technical as well as security reasons, as it gave this
early SIGINT service access to the AT&T cables, which terminated in New York.
The service operated under the belief that they were probably in violation of the
Communications Act of 1934 but never sought to test this proposition.  Communica-
tions Act of 1934, 7 U.S.C. § 151 (repealed 2000).
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During the first half of the 20th century, radio systems came into
use for communications, in addition to existing wire and cable sys-
tems, particularly for “long-haul” uses.  The complicating assumption
here was that, by broadcasting a radio wave where anyone with a re-
ceiver could listen, there could be no expectation of privacy.  Radio-
based systems were certainly a godsend for intelligence services who
found that in many cases proliferating receivers was easier than cable
tapping.  In domestic law enforcement applications, there were few
radio-based systems until the advent of cellular telephone, and the le-
gal regime dealt almost exclusively with landline technologies.87
Keeping things in perspective, Olmstead, which was the law from
1928 until Katz in 1967, held that all warrantless domestic wiretapping
was lawful, and it did not even touch the concept of intercept for intel-
ligence purposes, presumably done outside the U.S. but in many cases
actually involving domestic technical operations.88 As already dis-
cussed at some length above, Katz radically changed the game for do-
mestic law enforcement and the conception of privacy under the
Fourth Amendment.  At the time, neither the CIA nor NSA saw it as
having any impact on their intelligence operations.  It was simply as-
sumed that foreign nationals had no rights under the Constitution and
that any domestic privacy rights did not apply to Americans abroad.
This relatively well-settled legal universe did not last long, falling
victim to disclosures of illegal or at least questionable activities in the
1970s and new technologies in the 1980s and 1990s.  As already men-
tioned, the disclosure of the CIA Family Jewels report called NSA and
CIA operations into severe question with resulting increases in Con-
gressional oversight.  Other complaints related to the Vietnam conflict
and surveillance operations led to the Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Act of 197889 and Executive Order 12333 (1981), which further
defined the roles and missions of the Intelligence Community.  At this
point, however, the legal evolution largely halted for roughly two de-
cades.  Cases were largely limited to the classified proceedings before
the FISA Court (“FISC”), and House and Senate intelligence commit-
tees conducted their deliberations largely in secret as well.
87. The landmark Katz case (1967) was well before the development and prolifer-
ation of cellular systems in the 1980s, and only recently have cases begun to deal with
issues related to cell phones.  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
88. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 467 (1928).  The operative statute
here being the National Security Act of 1947.  National Security Act of 1947, 50
U.S.C. §§ 401–442 (2012).  Among other things, this major overhaul of the U.S. na-
tional security structure established the Department of Defense and the Central Intel-
ligence Agency, proscribing CIA activities within the U.S.  Intercept and signals
intelligence were left with the military intelligence services until the establishment of
the National Security Agency (“NSA”) by a classified Presidential directive in 1952.
See STEPHEN A. CAMBONE, A NEW STRUCTURE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
PLANNING (1998).
89. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (2012).
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Major changes on the technology front seriously unsettled this uni-
verse, particularly the rapid proliferation of cellular phone systems
worldwide and the Internet’s explosive growth after 1990.  The only
significant piece of federal legislation during this period came in the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (“ECPA”), which
preceded the transition to the public Internet by some four years and
by all accounts stands in serious need of revision.  Apart from the
ECPA and a few other less significant statutes discussed above al-
ready, law in this area has been dominated by an increasing number of
federal and state cases, which are often in conflict or technologically
behind the times.
On the national security and intelligence side, the 9/11 terrorist at-
tacks radically changed the legal regime.  Use of new technologies
such as cell phones and the Internet by al Qaeda operatives to support
their operations quickly drove the Intelligence Community to the real-
ization that thwarting future terrorist attacks required far more exten-
sive access to these communications abroad, as well as within the
United States.  A creative interpretation of the 2001 Authorization for
the Use of Military Force (“AUMF”) by the Justice Department Of-
fice of Legal Counsel substantially expanded the scope of NSA activi-
ties and provided the basis for greatly enhanced surveillance of
suspected terrorists based on the claim that proposed NSA activity did
not violate the Fourth Amendment.90  Subsequent disclosures about
the highly classified program undertaken in 2005 led to both federal
court challenge as well as the FISA Amendments Act of 2008
(“FAA”), which sought to codify what the Justice Department had
previously seen as legal and provide retroactive immunity for firms
assisting the government in these efforts.  As noted, court challenges
to the FAA are still ongoing.91
Apart from the court challenges to NSA operations against sus-
pected terrorists by civil liberties groups such as the ACLU and the
EFF, most Americans probably see such intelligence activities as es-
sential to protecting the nation and simply do not have an issue with
90. See Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, to David Kris, Associate Deputy Attorney Gen., on Constitutionality
of Amending Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to Change the “Purpose” Stan-
dard for Searches (Sept. 25, 2001), available at https://ccrjustice.org/files/
memoforeignsurveillanceact09252001.pdf.
91. See, e.g., Pl.’s Compl., Wikimedia Found v. Nat’l  Sec. Agency, 2015 WL
1033734 (D. Md. Mar. 10, 2015).  The initial challenge to the 2008 FISA Amendment
Act (“FAA”) was ultimately dismissed by the Supreme Court in Clapper v. Amnesty,
133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013), on the basis of standing without addressing the constitutional
issue.  Subsequently two major cases have been brought where standing does not ap-
pear to be an issue.  In ACLU v. Clapper, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2d Cir. 2013), the Second
Circuit reversed the trial court ruling and held that the FAA violated Section 215 of
the USA PATRIOT Act.   In Klayman v. Obama (D.C. Cir. 2013) also held that the
bulk data collection program was a violation.  In light of recent Congressional action
the matter is likely moot.
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NSA storing their phone-record data or even their e-mails if it serves
to make the nation safe.92  However, this attitude is also based on the
fact that most Americans do not believe their Internet communication
will be subject to government surveillance.  As these systems have
come to dominate almost all aspects of modern life, users have, how-
ever, become far more sensitive to privacy issues.  Here too both Con-
gress and the courts have come to view the constitutional privacy
protections far differently and appear to be on a legislative and judi-
cial path that will further constrain future technology development
and government operations.93  This calls for a new balance between
rights and responsibilities as both the technologies and the law evolve,
including user expectations as well as legal interpretations of how con-
stitutional guarantees apply to new technologies and government ef-
forts to meet critical national security concerns.
In some significant areas, major issues are still before the courts,
and in others, the new and evolving technologies are simply not well
understood.  Rapid and seemingly unstoppable technological develop-
ment continues to greatly outpace existing law.  At the same time user
expectations and demands for enhanced security and privacy promise
to place even greater strains on the system as new technologies, me-
dia, and uses develop.
IX. DEMANDS FOR INTERNET PRIVACY AND ANONYMITY IMPACT
OF NATIONAL SECURITY
Complicating demands for Internet privacy is the emergence of In-
ternet anonymity.  Just as users demand personal “privacy,” they now
encounter additional problems raised by anonymous postings that can
be libelous, fraudulent, or the Internet equivalent of intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress.  Clearly some Internet web sites and traffic
can pose significant threats to national security. Increasingly, there are
sites used to recruit terrorists, support their operations, and provide a
communication medium.   It is also the case that in the current tech-
nology environment geography is no longer relevant as it was in prior
days.  Distinguishing U.S. operations and even “U.S. persons” from
92. It remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court will ultimately overturn
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), and extend the privacy concept to what is
now being referred to as “metadata” and was previously seen as business records
rather than personal information protected under Katz.
93. This has not always been the case.  Until the landmark case Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the Supreme Court held that the constitutional protections
of the Fourth Amendment did not apply to electronic communications at all.  Subse-
quent decisions, and particularly the recent case United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945
(2012), have greatly broadened the scope of privacy protection.  Statutes such as the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (1986) and others also add to this domain.
See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat.
1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
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“non-U.S.” persons and operations has become an exceedingly diffi-
cult and often impossible task.
Additional complications are raised by the nature of the new media.
Some Internet traffic is purely private—between two people or a se-
lect small number of people—and presumably is protected, and more
importantly users have come to expect such protection of their per-
sonal communications since Katz.  Indeed, to preserve the essence of
American liberty and the letter and the goal of the Fourth Amend-
ment, it must be protected from warrantless scrutiny in keeping with
the Court’s criteria in Katz.  Other data, which is now termed
“metadata” (such as phone numbers called or the IP address of In-
ternet communications) has not traditionally been protected in the
same manner but is the subject of an ongoing legal debate.  The Court
in Smith saw such data more as business records than personal com-
munications and did not accord it the type of Fourth Amendment pro-
tection that it afforded personal communications in Katz.94
There is, however, a third category, which could be called “quasi-
private data”—where users post information to social media sites, list
servers, and other public websites (or to large segments of the public).
The extent to which this category is in fact actually private or warrants
the same types of protection is an area that is just beginning to be
explored by legal scholars and the courts.  Finally, there is a huge area
of basically unregulated data, and the collection of that data, by e-
commerce entities.  These companies mine data, e-mails, and Internet
searches for commercial purposes.  The data is then used in-house or
sold to third parties for advertising purposes and other commercial
activities, including determining who might receive credit card offers,
who might be eligible for a housing loan, or who might be offered a
job.95
X. SECURITY, PRIVACY, AND THE LAW IN THE JONES ERA
The first part of the 21st century brought a world of new devices,
applications, and accompanying Big Data.  At the same time, there
have been dramatic changes in user expectations of both privacy and
security.  In addition, various disclosures as well as major studies
about government surveillance programs adopted since the 9/11 at-
tacks have fueled a broader debate over essential security require-
ments and competing privacy demands.96
94. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 749 (1979).  Congress, however, began to
impose similar warrant requirements on such data, known then as “pen register” or
“trap and trace” data under the  Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
(ECPA). See 18 U.S.C. ch. 206 (2012).  To date, the ECPA has not been challenged as
being unconstitutional, and the Court has yet to overturn Smith v. Maryland.
95. This issue is set out in great detail in ANDREWS, supra note 69.
96. See PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE TELE-
PHONE RECORDS PROGRAM CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PA-
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It is generally agreed that the legal regime for cyberspace is seri-
ously outdated and generations behind current technologies.  Several
key cases are currently before the courts, and proposed legislation
awaits action before Congress.  Major concerns exist as to how new
presidential directives, laws, privacy and national security interests,
and court decisions will impact technology development.  Certainly
the technology path will not stop or be reversed.  Increasing Big Data
gathering will continue to accumulate it on systems worldwide,
presenting an ever greater challenge to public policy.
Increasingly many Americans believe that the Fourth Amendment
protects privacy from government surveillance as a right and that free-
dom and independence may not be possible without some semblance
of this privacy.97  As early as 1963, three decades before the Internet
was commonly used, Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren noted
that technological innovation was diminishing privacy expectations
and predicted this problem would get worse.98  Justices Douglas,
Brandeis, and others have also interpreted the Fourth Amendment as
providing a fundamental right to privacy that needs to be upheld in
order for justice and freedom to prevail.99 At the same time, national
security requirements have required practices and intelligence opera-
tions that, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, have been viewed as critical
for the nation’s safety.   However, increasingly these practices and op-
erations have recently come under attack.100
Data privacy suits have increased in number and notoriety in recent
years, and the issue of “injury in fact” has become an early challenge
for privacy plaintiffs to prove.101  Normally this type of injury is rarely
TRIOT ACT AND ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE COURT (Jan. 23, 2014); see also RICHARD A. CLARKE ET. AL., LIB-
ERTY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF
THE PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP ON INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS TECH-
NOLOGIES (Dec. 12, 2013).  At the same time as these outstanding studies, unlawful
disclosures by Edward Snowden first published on June 5, 2013, in the British newspa-
per The Guardian have received widespread media attention and have served to focus
additional attention in this critical area.
97. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472–73 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Significantly, as Andrews notes, most Americans seem oblivious to the massive collec-
tion of private (often very personal) data by Internet providers, web sites, and com-
mercial data miners.  The collection of this data is almost entirely unregulated, even
though it can be deeply personal, can affect the financial, employment, and even
health care status of people, and has been used (or abused) by  corporations with
pernicious results. ANDREWS, supra note 69.
98. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 441 (1963) (Warren, J., concurring).
99. Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 343 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 472–73 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
100. See the opinion of Judge Claire Egan for explanation of  the FISA court’s
rationale for approving the Section 215 telephone records program. In Re FBI for an
Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from Redacted, No. BR 13-109, 2013
WL 5741573 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013).
101. In re Google, Inc. Privacy Policy Litig., No. C-12-01382-PSG, 2013 WL
6248499, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2013) (citing In re iPhone Application Litig., No.
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\2-4\TWL404.txt unknown Seq: 27  7-MAR-16 14:45
2015] SECURITY, PRIVACY, AND TECHNOLOGY 623
an issue in lawsuits but is as big an obstacle for data privacy plaintiffs
as Mount Kilimanjaro is for hikers.102  Here, the Wiretap Act of
1968103 (which was actually Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968)104 comes into play.  This statute provides
a private right of action against any person who “intentionally in-
tercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to inter-
cept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic
communication.”105   Furthermore, the Stored Communications
Act106 (actually Title III of the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act of 1986) prohibits providers of electronic communication from
“knowingly divulging to any person or entity the contents of a com-
munication.”107  Congress is now seeking to extend this protection to
the data of Americans that is stored abroad on servers and cloud ser-
vices in the Law Enforcement Access to Data Stored Abroad Act
(“LEADS Act”).
When Congress passed the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
(“ECPA”),108 including the Stored Communications Act, in 1986 it
was landmark legislation.109 Passed close to three decades ago, it pre-
ceded the Internet by several years.  Clearly technology has evolved
dramatically in these decades in ways never imagined.110  Still, by 1986
the use of computers and network-related technology had grown sig-
5:11–md–02250–LHK, 2013 WL 6212591, at *1012 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2013)); Pirozzi
v. Apple Inc., 913 F. Supp. 2d 840, 847 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
102. Id.
103. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522.
104. Privacy Wiretap Act, INTERNET LAW TREATISE, https://ilt.eff.org/index.php/
Privacy:_Wiretap_Act (last modified Jan. 28, 2007, 7:14 PM).
105. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a); see id. § 2520.
106. Stored Wire and Electronic Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712
(2012).  According to the Department of Justice, “The Electronic Communications
Privacy Act and the Stored Wire Electronic Communications Act are commonly re-
ferred together as the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) of 1986.”
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Electronic Communications Privacy
Act of 1986 (ECPA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522, JUST. INFO. SHARING, https://it.ojp.gov/
default.aspx?area=privacy&page=1285 (last modified July 30, 2013).  The ECPA up-
dated the Federal Wiretap Act of 1968, which addressed interception of conversations
using “hard” telephone lines but did not apply to interception of computer and other
digital and electronic communications. Id.  Several subsequent pieces of legislation,
including The USA PATRIOT Act, clarify and update the ECPA to keep pace with
the evolution of new communications technologies and methods, including easing re-
strictions on law enforcement access to stored communications in some cases.” 18
U.S.C. § 2702(a).
107. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a).
108. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522.
109. Id.
110. Christina Bonnington, Apple Mac at 30: See the Evolution of an Icon, WIRED
(Jan. 25, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/01/30th-apple-anniversary/; Matt
Honan, New Tools Show How Deep Glass will Embed in Our Live, WIRED (Nov. 19,
2013, 3:00 PM), http://www.wired.com/2013/11/google-glass-sdk/; Amanda Scherker,
Family Banned All Technology Made After 1986, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 3, 2013,
5:44 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/03/family-living-1986_n_3860
365.html.
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nificantly and individuals had begun using personal computers to ac-
cess remote networks and data.111   When Congress passed the ECPA,
one goal was to reassure industry that its growth would not be con-
strained by individuals’ fears regarding the privacy of their communi-
cations and data maintained on computer servers.112   Under then-
existing Supreme Court precedent, it was far from clear that the Su-
preme Court would extend Fourth Amendment protection to these
new technologies.113
Legal scholars have criticized the current law at length.  Professor
Orin Kerr argues that the lack of a suppression remedy has confused
courts on how to respond (or even provide a remedy) to an unautho-
rized interception.114  Others argue that all private communication
and stored data should be protected equally.115  Still others have
shown that under the current language the same e-mail is subject to
different protection depending on whether it is in transit, stored on a
home computer, opened and stored in remote storage, unopened and
stored in remote storage for 180 days or less, or unopened and stored
in remote storage for more than 180 days.  Judges have also expressed
concerns about the inconsistent protections within the act.  One circuit
court has struck down, on constitutional grounds, the provision that
does not provide protection for electronic communication after 180
days in temporary storage.  The Court found this provision unconsti-
tutional because it authorizes less than a probable-cause standard for
government agents seeking a warrant to search private
communications.116
For decades now, scholars have debated ways to improve the ex-
isting legal regime and its intersection with the Fourth Amendment.117
One side of this debate proposes a universal search warrant require-
111. Melissa Medina, The Stored Communications Act: An Old Statute for Modern
Times, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 267, 272 (2013).
112. Id. at 291 n.166.
113. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 721 (1984); United States v. White, 401
U.S. 745, 754 (1971).
114. Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and A Legis-
lator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1243 (2004).
115. See,  e.g., Robert A. Pikowsky, The Need for Revisions to the Law of Wiretap-
ping and Interception of Email, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 49–50
(2003).
116. See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010); Marc Zwil-
linger & Jacob Sommer, Sixth Circuit’s En Banc Reversal in Warshak Sidesteps Consti-
tutionality of Stored Communication Act’s Delayed Notification Provision, 7 PRIVACY
& SEC. L. REP. (BNA) No. 32, Aug. 11, 2008, at 49–51.
117. See Daniel J. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1264, 1299–300 (2004); Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New
Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801,
808–10 (2004); Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH.
L. REV. 311, 315 (2012); Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Codification and Pro-
fessor Kerr’s Misguided Call for Judicial Deference, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 747, 749
(2005); Kerr, supra note 114, at 1208–09.
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ment.  Advocates on the other side of the debate argue that Congress
is best suited to enact laws to protect privacy because the Courts are
faced with the disadvantage of trying to hit a “moving target” (i.e., the
continuing development of technology) while interpreting at a distinct
moment in time the case and controversy before them.118  Most ex-
perts, however, agree that the existing legal regime needs to be modi-
fied to improve its application to modern technology and the demands
of Big Data.119
A. Fourth Amendment Interpretation
Traditionally, the Fourth Amendment right to privacy has been
viewed as a property right,120 and searches involved physical prop-
erty—the amendment protected “the right of the people to be secure
in their persons, house, papers, and effects.”121  Searches of property
required a warrant issued by a magistrate supported by probable
cause.122   While the Fourth Amendment right to privacy and right to
be exempt from unreasonable (and usually warrantless) searches still
maintains its foundation in property rights, the Supreme Court has
also supplemented property-based privacy rights with a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy outside of any physical property.123
Current conceptions of privacy are based on Katz, where the Court
held that, even in a public place, a person could have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his person.124  Justice Harlan’s concurrence
in Katz has served as the guiding principle for the analysis of whether
a search violates a reasonable expectation of privacy, establishing two
requirements for a reasonable expectation of privacy:  (1) a person has
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy; and (2) the ex-
pectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as “reasonable”
(objective).125  Writing for the majority, Justice Potter Stewart rea-
soned, “[W]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his
own home or office is not a subject of the Fourth Amendment protec-
118. Orin S. Kerr, Congress, the Courts, and New Technologies: A Response to Pro-
fessor Solove, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 779, 782–83 (2005).
119. Robert A. Pikowsky, The Need for Revisions to the Law of Wiretapping and
Interception of Email, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 65–66 (2003).
120. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012); Florida v. Jardines, 133 S.
Ct. 1409, 1417–18 (2013).  Indeed, the famous Warren and Brandeis article, supra note
28, grounded the claim for privacy in property rights, with a tort remedy similar to
common law trespass. See also, Wagner, supra note 7, at 7 (Comments in response to
the Office of Science and Technology Policy, Government “Big Data” Request for
Information, March 4, 2014).
121. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
122. Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 354 (1972).
123. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at  954; Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417–18; Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
124. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
125. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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tion.”126  He continued, however, to say, “But what he seeks to pre-
serve as private, even in an area accessible to public, may be
constitutionally protected.”127
For close to a half-century now, Katz has served as a foundation for
determining whether behavior constitutes a violation of the Fourth
Amendment right to privacy.  Moving beyond communications, the
Court has applied these principles in considering whether there is a
reasonable expectation of privacy in “open fields” outside of the curti-
lage of a home.128   The reasonable-expectation test remains as to
whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy where there is no
property right at issue, such as in electronic communications or data
storage.
B. Exposure to the Public
Cases following Katz stand for the principle that what one know-
ingly exposes to the public is not subject to Fourth Amendment pro-
tection.129   Furthermore, as the Court articulated in California v.
Greenwood, “[a]n expectation of privacy does not give rise to Fourth
Amendment constitutional protection unless society is prepared to ac-
cept that expectation as objectively reasonable.”130  However, it must
also be noted that there are numerous drug related cases after Katz
and both before and after Greenwood where the Court seems to have
ignored what would seem like common-sense understandings of pri-
vacy and security from unreasonable searches, such as the police
photographing fenced-in yards or roof tops from planes and
helicopters.131
126. Id. at 351.
127. Id.
128. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 184 (1984); United States v. Dunn, 480
U.S. 294, 305 (1987).
129. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
130. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39–40 (1988).  In Greenwood, the Court
held that garbage left at the side of the road is readily accessible to animals, children,
scavengers, and other members of the public. Id.
131. In California v. Ciraolo, the Court upheld the right of the police to fly over a
house in a small airplane, at an altitude of 1,000 feet.  California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S.
207, 209 (1986).  From the airplane, the police officers identified marijuana growing in
the yard and photographed it.  The yard was surrounded by two fences, a six-foot high
outer fence and a ten-foot high inner fence. Id.  After this flyover, the police obtained
a search warrant for a physical inspection of the property. Id. at 209–10.  The Su-
preme Court held that the overflight did not constitute a search, despite the facts that
the yard was within “the curtilage of [defendant’s] house,” that a fence shielded the
yard from observation from the street, and that the occupant had a “subjective expec-
tation of privacy. Id. at 211–12.  The Court, however, found this expectation “unrea-
sonable and . . . not an expectation that society is prepared to honor.” Id. at 209, 214.
After Ciraolo, the Court in Florida v. Riley upheld the legality of an observation of an
enclosed greenhouse with a helicopter.  Using “a camera with a telephoto lens, and
while circling over the property at an altitude of 400 feet,” a Sheriff’s deputy “ob-
served marijuana growing within the greenhouse.  The deputy was able to see through
the roof because two of the panels in the roof were missing.”  W.F. “Casey” Ebsary,
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Most recently, the Court has issued another landmark privacy deci-
sion in United States v. Jones, a case involving a GPS tracker which
police attached to a drug dealer’s vehicle without judicial approval
and then used the information from the tracker as evidence to convict
him.132  The Court held that the reasonable expectation of privacy test
supplements the property-based expectation of privacy and, therefore,
the placing of a GPS tracker on the vehicle in effect constituted an
unlawful search.133  Here, the Court fundamentally overturned prior
law established in 1983’s United States v. Knotts, where the Court
under similar circumstances declined to find a violation of the expec-
tation of privacy.134  The Knotts Court held that a person traveling on
public roads has no expectation of privacy in his movements because
the vehicle’s starting point, direction, stops, or final destination could
be seen by anyone else on the road, in what has been referred to as
the open fields doctrine.
Concurring in the Jones decision, Justice Sonia Sotomayor reasoned
that unrestrained power to assemble data that reveals private aspects
of identity is susceptible to abuse and warned that that it may be nec-
essary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third
parties because it is ill-suited to the digital age.135  Foretelling the is-
sues of Big Data, Justice Sotomayor went on to raise concerns over
the comprehensiveness of a record of personal movements and a
“wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious,
and sexual associations.”136  To protect the information, however, re-
quires that “Fourth Amendment jurisprudence ceases to treat secrecy
as a prerequisite for privacy.”137  As Justice Thurgood Marshall stated,
“privacy is not a discrete commodity, possessed absolutely or not at
all.”138
A number of courts have subsequently cited Jones on a range of
privacy issues, including numerous federal appellate courts, FISC, and
the Supreme Court itself.139
Jr., Note, Fourth Amendment Aerial Privacy: Expect the Unexpected, 19 STETSON L.
REV. 273, 273 (1989).  The Court, characterizing the greenhouse as having a partially
open roof, noted that “the helicopter in this case was not violating the law” and had
not “interfered with respondent’s normal use of the greenhouse or of other parts of
the curtilage.”  Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451–52 (1989).  These cases are dis-
cussed in greater detail in Finkelman, Second Casualty of War, supra note 54, at
1413–15.
132. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948–49 (2012).
133. Id. at  949, 952.
134. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983).
135. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956–57 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
136. Id. at 955.
137. Id. at 957.
138. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 749 (1979).
139. See Amended Memorandum Opinion, In Re Application of the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things, op.
cit., and Opinion and Order, No. PR/TT [redacted] (FISA Ct.).
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XI. MEETING THE CHALLENGE—TOWARD A NATIONAL POLICY
It is the unfortunate reality that in the 1990s—the Internet’s first
critical decade—there was virtually no national policy on cyber-
security.   Cybersecurity during this important formative stage of the
Internet was in large part either nonexistent, badly managed, poorly
funded, and in some cases simply absurd.  As the Internet exploded in
terms of users and applications and as evolving threats emerged, there
was little national consensus as to whose responsibility it was to secure
cyberspace and respond to these threats.  It is true that at the outset
cybersecurity was scarcely an issue since there was essentially nothing
on the Internet to steal or hack, and access was largely limited to a
very few users who were hardwired to a few mainframe computers.140
From the beginning, the government, and especially the military,
became a large-scale Internet user, and truly the “pig at the trough,”
while the government did little to protect this vital resource.  As a
whole, government saw this as a responsibility of the commercial ser-
vice providers while government programs to deal with it were mini-
mal and inadequate.  This is particularly remarkable because, unlike
earlier technological breakthroughs in communication—such as Jo-
hannes Gutenberg’s moveable-type press, Alexander Graham Bell’s
telephone, and Guglielmo Marconi’s radio—the government was in
fact the major player in developing the Internet.  Moreover, the entire
national security community, including the military, were key players
in this development.  Given the military’s penchant for secrecy and
security—and the strong military needs for both—it is astounding that
the federal government did not take a far greater role in creating and
developing effective cybersecurity.  The government was, however,
clearly aware of the evolving problem.  A major study directed by
President Bill Clinton in 1998 explored the issue at length and di-
rected the development of a national plan for dealing with the
problems.141  Unfortunately the funding and program direction to im-
plement this plan was never provided.
In the 1990s the nation failed to see the real potential of the cyber-
threats, especially from overseas.  As government (especially the mili-
tary and national security agencies) and the financial sector became
large Internet users, they added Big Data to the networked world and
became lucrative targets for major criminal enterprises and foreign
intelligence services and foreign military forces who foresaw
cyberwarfare.142  At the time, America focused largely on defense
against hackers and lower-level threats and was not looking to the
larger evolving threat environment.
140. See Wagner, supra note 7.
141. See Presidential Decision Directive on Critical Infrastructure Protection, NSC
63 (May 22, 1998).
142. See, e.g., APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units, MANDIANT
(2013), http://intelreport.mandiant.com/Mandiant_APT1_Report.pdf.
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While the 9/11 attacks themselves had little to do with cyberwarfare
or Big Data,143 they did provide a catalytic shock to the government in
terms of looking far more seriously at new threats, particularly in the
technology space.  Terrorists’ use of cell phones, the Internet, and
ATMs now became a serious subject of interest.  Programs focusing
on these technologies, which languished in the 1990s, received re-
newed attention and support.  At the same time a number of early
cyber-attacks such as Moonlight Maze (from Russia in 1999), Titan
Rain (from China in 2004), and others attacking critical systems drove
home the reality of growing threats.
A. A Strategy for Cyberwarfare
Increasing cyberattacks from foreign groups have raised the specter
of cyberwarfare as a realistic arena for future conflict.  Analysts con-
tinue to debate as to how conduct “combat” in this new type of war-
fare, which has no geography and differs from the traditional model of
kinetic warfare.  At the moment, no one in the military, the intelli-
gence community, or the legal community knows what “rules” of war-
fare apply, and the extent to which the elements of loss of life and
destruction of property—the two cornerstones of the kinetic model of
warfare—might apply in the cyber-war context.
B. Cyberspace Is Part of a Highly Dynamic World
Cybersecurity has become an essential element of life in the wired
world.  This is a highly dynamic universe where both the technology
base and the threats continue to evolve.  For some time now this
world has moved into an era of “digital everything” with an almost
seamless merger of communications, computing, and media of all
kinds, including largely digital Big Data.  Coupled with hardware and
communications bandwidth that has become increasingly cheap, the
marginal costs of communications are free or, in many cases, nearly
so.  All these factors—especially the rapidly developing and increas-
ingly inexpensive technology and access to the Internet—have caused
use of cyberspace to grow by orders of magnitude in a few short years.
The enabling technologies and economics have also brought about
some major changes in culture.  Use of the net, devices, and advent of
Big Data have brought about modern cultural artifacts from Internet
143. The 9/11 terrorists did use cell phones, e-mail, and ATM machines to facilitate
their crime.  The United States, on the other hand, generally failed to use readily
available electronic tools that might have thwarted some of the attackers.  At least
three 9/11 terrorists were stopped by police shortly before the attack, but watch-lists,
outstanding warrants, and immigration violations were not available to local police at
the time, although the technology existed to provide them with this information.  Su-
san Candiott, Another Hijacker Was Stopped for Traffic Violation, CNN.COM/U.S.
(Jan. 8, 2002, 2:27 AM), available at http://edition.cnn.com/2002/US/01/09/
inv.hijacker.traffic.stops/.
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dating to social awareness streams. Internet-based commerce is fast
surpassing all other forms, while businesses as well as the government
agencies have become almost totally dependent on Internet-based
systems.
System architects are increasingly moving to a cloud concept, while
more serious threats from cyber criminals, cyber warriors, and cyber
terrorists across the globe continue to grow.  Thus, it is increasingly
important that any policy or strategy employ effective defensive and
offensive elements that aid in meeting overall strategic objectives as
well as user demands for privacy, security, and resilience.  Meeting
these sometimes-competing demands presents an increasingly com-
plex policy challenge.
C. Building the Technology Base
Implementing a successful national strategy must necessarily start
with building the technology base.   This largely involves educating
people with the skills necessary to meet the emerging challenges.  It is
also an area that simply requires the “best and the brightest” to create
the type of software and other technologies required.  Educating peo-
ple to meet this challenge requires a new level of commitment to the
nation’s universities, possibly using the model of the Eisenhower Ad-
ministration in responding to the Cold War challenges of the Space
Race144 and the need to modernize the national highway system.  This
might require a concerted effort—and Congressional appropriations
to match it—similar to the National Defense Education Act,145 Na-
tional Defense Highway Act, and the expansion of support for univer-
sities, including the push to provide higher education for more
Americans.
This model for cyberspace and Big Data makes good sense, and it is
reasonably certain that the universities are not able to meet this chal-
lenge utilizing internal resources alone.  In the current economic cli-
mate even the major private universities are constrained, while most
144. At that critical point in history, the nation undertook a series of coordinated
initiatives starting with substantial government investment in higher education, espe-
cially in science and math education, under the National Defense Education Act
(NDEA).  National Defense Education Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-864, 72 Stat. 1580
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).  The government initiated
new technology agencies, such as the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA),
the National Science Foundation (NSF), and others.
145. The National Defense Education Act (NDEA) was signed into law on Sep-
tember 2, 1958, providing funding to U.S. educational institutions at all levels, and
was one of several science initiatives inaugurated by President to advance technology
in the U.S.  National Defense Education Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-864, 72 Stat. 1580
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).  Other initiatives included
the formation of ARPA (new DARPA) and NASA.  At the time there was a growing
national sense that U.S. scientists were falling behind scientists in the Soviet Union,
catalyzed, arguably, by early Soviet success in the Space Race, notably the launch of
the first-ever satellite, Sputnik, the previous year.
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public universities are under enormous economic pressure.  While
there is sound logic that shows there are increasing numbers of jobs in
cyberspace, the fact does not seem compelling enough to overcome
the level of inertia in education and government funding today.
D. Acceleration of Government Programs
Notwithstanding budgetary pressures, it is increasingly clear that
the government cannot continue to be the pig at the trough in terms of
massive net use.  The government cannot be the single largest user of
the Internet but fail to adequately fund effective security programs.  It
can no longer afford to maintain the false expectation that the private
sector will recognize the full scope of the problems and remedy them.
Efforts to protect the Internet and Big Data need continued and
increasing support.  Not all of these tasks can be left to the Defense
Department and intelligence agencies.  Without exception, all other
governmental agencies have become major users of cyberspace and
need to become partners in its ongoing protection.  The nation may
even need an entirely new cabinet-level agency to deal with communi-
cations and the Internet.
E. Partnership with Industry
Aside from limited government funding, one reason national policy
on cyberspace failed in the 1990s was a basic misunderstanding of the
role industry could and would play in securing the net and protecting
Big Data.   There were unreasonable expectations that industry would
recognize the vulnerabilities and fix them.  It was believed that it was
not essential for the government to support this in a meaningful way
and that user demands, from both the public and private spheres,
would drive industry to meet the challenge—a belief that was only
partially correct.  What was done was largely inadequate and insuffi-
cient to meet the threats that evolved.  The reasons for this are obvi-
ous.  No one was in charge, and no entity had any responsibility to act,
so it was in the best interest of each large player to let “the other guy”
fix the problem.  In addition, average users—who faced embarrass-
ment, identity theft, exposure of the most private aspects of their lives,
and asset theft—lacked the requisite knowledge to even understand
the problems, much less have any idea how to fix them.
Policy now requires a more realistic approach to industry involve-
ment on several levels.  It is essential to recognize that industry built
cyberspace and created Big Data—and that industry will fix it, irre-
spective of who pays.  By and large, the government can only write
checks, not computer code.146  Even in the most sensitive areas the
146. Alternatively, the national government could develop some sort of Manhattan
Project style enterprise to fix the Internet or create semi-autonomous institutes, along
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actual work is outsourced to commercial firms with few programmers
being government employees.
Here, the nation needs to move to a model where the technology
companies that dominate cyberspace are made a more integral part of
the process.  The model that was highly effective in dealing with the
communications firms for decades is a useful one that has not been
effectively employed where cyberspace is concerned.  Certainly some
of the traditional telecoms are within the tent, but many of the most
important and critical firms are not.  In the final analysis, the nation
needs to look ahead at what the solution is going to be, and work back
from that, making sure that the technology base and the supporting
industrial base can meet the very real threats and challenges ahead.
Policy has also now evolved to the point that intelligence services
such as the NSA, whose mission has been strictly limited to national
security requirements, are now being directed by the White House to
support some sixteen commercial areas and under a far more modern
concept of what national security actually means.  Thus, as NSA Di-
rector Admiral Mike Rogers noted last year:
Cyber threats are different from physical threats since they travel
beyond geographical boundaries.  Cyber threats are also blurring
the line between the public and private sectors, sometimes prompt-
ing new and unexpected partnerships.  If you had told me (in the
past) that I was going to be spending time working on an offensive
act against a motion picture company, I would have thought:
“What? What does that have to do with me?” And yet that’s the
world we find ourselves in.147
Another key element of this partnership needs to be with the hold-
ers of Big Data, including the financial sector, the health services in-
dustry, and the telecoms and Internet service providers who hold
increasingly large amounts of this information.  One aspect of this
partnership needs to be the timely and accurate provision of threat
data coming from government sources and vice versa.148  Another is a
far broader national policy and legal regime that recognizes the role
that industry servers and clouds have in maintaining Big Data and
protecting both the privacy of users and the security of their data.
These are by no means simple issues.  They continue to involve a
number of complex technical, legal, and financial considerations, all of
the lines of the Rand Corporation, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, or NASA, to fix
this problem.  But in the currently political climate this seems unlikely.
147. Mike De Souza, NSA Chief Says Sony Attack Traced to North Korea After
Software Analysis, REUTERS (Feb. 19, 2015, 9:22 PM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/
2015/02/19/uk-nsa-northkorea-sony-idUKKBN0LN27U20150219 (quoting Admiral
Rogers interview).  Admiral Rogers was referring here to a recent “hack” of Sony
Pictures Corporation e-mail attributed to North Korean hackers that was highly publi-
cized. Id.
148. The current Defense Industrial Base (“DIB”) effort is one useful approach,
but a far more extensive set of program is needed.
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which are in a constant state of change.  Here, it is essential to engage
a wide range of Americans in the process of developing an effective
national policy in this most critical area.  It is also the case that both
the executive branch and Congress are aware of the fact that laws in
this area are antiquated and new legislation is required.  For several
years now, a number of well-drafted bills have enjoyed bipartisan sup-
port within Congress but have yet to be enacted.  While this situation
will hopefully change, the courts will continue to bear an increasing
burden of balancing security and privacy.
